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Abstract 
The European sovereign debt crisis has had a profound impact on the rest of the world.  
The “debt crisis” refers to the rapid accumulation of debt within some struggling euro-zone 
countries.  This debt accumulation has resulted in a variety of financial bailouts made to various 
countries within the European Union and a debt default by the country of Greece.  The results of 
this crisis have changed the way of life for many living within the struggling economies.  
Division within the euro zone, on both policy and ideology, has begged the question of whether 
the euro will be able to survive in the long term.  The purpose of this report is to investigate the 
buildup and evolution of this crisis, as well as to highlight various responses and proposed 
solutions of the future. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
European Financial Crisis* 
 
The European Union, currently consisting of twenty-eight member nations, has been 
battling a financial crisis that has been one of the main focuses of the entire world.  This 
financial crisis has had profound implications for the rest of the world.  The crisis essentially 
stems from the issue of managing multiple countries, each having a variety of unique 
circumstances, using uniform policy. 
The European Union originated from an idea that was aimed at eliminating the frequent 
wars between neighboring countries which culminated in World War II.  The vision of the 
European Union’s founding fathers was simple: a peaceful, united, and prosperous Europe.  This 
grand idea was originally proposed on September 19, 1946 by Winston Churchill in a speech at 
Zurich University.  In December of 1946, the European Federalists Union was created in Paris, 
France.  Then in 1947, The Joint International Committee for European Unity was created to 
promote intergovernmental cooperation between the European countries.  In a landmark meeting 
in May of 1948, over eight hundred delegates from Europe, along with observers from the 
United States and Canada, held a five-day meeting in The Hague, Netherlands.  The meetings, 
chaired by Winston Churchill, resulted in an attempt to unify the economic, political, and 
monetary unions of Europe.  This call to action resulted in The European Movement, formally 
created on October 25, 1948.  Still in existence today, The European Movement consists of 41 
European countries and promotes integration and cooperation. 
*Information for the introduction is excerpted from The European Union’s website (European Union, 2013) 
- europa.eu; except where noted 
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The process towards integration continued when the European Coal and Steel 
Community began to unite.  With implementation of the Schuman plan in April of 1951, six 
countries placed two of their top industries under common management.  The six countries, 
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, agreed to this plan so that 
none could produce weapons of war to use against the others.  More integration took place with 
the signing of The Treaty of Rome in March of 1957.  The treaty created four institutions: a 
Council of Ministers, a Commission, a European Parliament, and a Court of Justice.  These four 
institutions were developed to legislate, generate new ideas, and to resolve disputes among 
European nations.  The treaty was also the founding treaty of the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”).  The EEC created a common market among member nations (originally 
the same nations that created the European Coal and Steel Community).  This community 
worked towards the goals of free movement of labor and capital, the abolition of trusts and 
cartels, and the development of joint and reciprocal policies on labor, social welfare, agriculture, 
transport, and foreign trade. 
One of the earliest accomplishments of the EEC was the establishment of uniform price 
levels on agricultural products among member nations in 1962.  Later, in 1968, internal tariffs on 
trade among member nations were eliminated and the common external tariffs of the member 
counties became fixed.   
By 1970, trade between member countries of the EEC had increased fivefold.  
Membership in the EEC expanded in January of 1973 by adding Denmark, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom.  The EEC further expanded in 1981 with the addition of Greece, and again in 
1986 with Portugal and Spain.   
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In 1979, several new advancements were created, including creation of The European 
Monetary System.  The year 1987 saw the implementation of the Single European Act, which 
gave European Parliament members the ability to vote on legislation, with the number of votes 
dependent on each member’s population. (Wilde, 2013) 
On February 7, 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed.  This treaty, commonly 
known as the Treaty of Maastricht, came into effect on November 1, 1993 and changed the 
European Economic Community into the European Union (“EU”).  The new European Union 
consisted of three pillars: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
Justice of Home Affairs. 
The first pillar, The European Communities, concerns the domains in which the member 
states share their sovereignty in the community institutions.  The second pillar, Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, replaces provisions of the Single European Act, allowing member states to 
take joint action in foreign policy.  This involves an intergovernmental decision-making process 
largely reliant on unanimity.  The third pillar, Justice of Home Affairs, deals with cooperation in 
the field of justice and home affairs.  This implies that the Union is expected to partake in joint 
efforts to offer European citizens a high level of protection, justice, and freedom.  The decisions 
made concerning this pillar are also intergovernmental.  Externally, the Treaty of Maastricht 
resulted from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.  Internally, the reasoning for the 
Treaty was that member states wished to supplement the progress and success that had been 
realized by the Single European Act.  One of the most significant activities of the European 
Union was the creation of a single currency in 1999 – the euro. 
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The European Union expanded in 1995 with the addition of Sweden, Austria and Finland.  
Later, in 2004, the EU further expanded with the additions of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  The next step of 
development came with the Lisbon Treaty.  The treaty was an amended work of an earlier 
proposal that had been rejected by member nations.  The Lisbon Treaty installed a European 
Union president and Foreign Minister.  The treaty also expanded the European Union’s legal 
powers through further developing the existing bodies.  The Lisbon Treaty, originally signed in 
2007, was finally implemented in 2009, after facing opposition.  The first ‘President of the 
European Council’ became Herman Van Rompuy, former Belgium Prime Minister, and the first 
‘High Representative for Foreign Affairs’ became Baroness Ashton from Britain.  The most 
recent expansion of the European Union happened on July 1, 2013 with the addition of Croatia.  
The current number of European Union member nations is twenty-eight. 
All member states of the European Union except Denmark and the United Kingdom are 
required to eventually utilize the euro as their currency and join the euro zone.  To be considered 
a part of the euro zone, a country must adopt the euro as their currency.  However, before a 
country is allowed to join, it must meet certain standards known as ‘convergence criteria’.  
Denmark and the United Kingdom are two members of the European Union that are considered 
outside of the euro zone due to the fact that they use their own currency.  These two member 
states are able to use their own currencies due to reasons of economic sovereignty.  However, 
both countries are allowed to join in the future if they so desire.  All European Union member 
states are part of the Economic and Monetary Union.  This simply means that nations coordinate 
their economic policy to generate the highest level of welfare for the Union as a whole. 
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Formally, the convergence criteria are defined as a set of macroeconomic indicators.  
These indicators measure price stability, sustainability of public finances, exchange-rate stability, 
and long-term interest rates.  The indicators measuring price stability are in place to ensure 
inflation is controlled and the country exhibits overall stability.  This criterion is measured by 
using the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (“HICP”) inflation rate.  The measurement is 
made in the same way that we measure this number in the United States using the Consumer 
Price Index.  The official convergence criterion used by the euro zone requires that consumer 
price inflation is no more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three member states 
with the lowest HICP inflation. 
Indicators are also used to measure the soundness and sustainability of public finances.  
These criteria impose limits on government borrowing and national debt to avoid an 
insurmountable deficit that could affect the entire euro zone.  The specific convergence criterion 
in terms of sound public finances is that government deficit as a percent of GDP must not be 
more than three percent at the end of the fiscal year.  Furthermore, the euro zone requires that the 
ratio of gross government debt relative to GDP must not exceed 60 percent. 
 Countries originally wishing to join the euro zone also were required to join the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism which was operated under the European Monetary System.  
Countries were required to be a part of the system for two consecutive years, and could not 
devalue its currency during those years.  Under the current Exchange Rate Mechanism II, the 
applying nation must show that it has been successful at keeping its exchange rate within a 
fifteen percent range from a central rate which does not change.  Lastly, applicants must hold 
long-term interest rates to no more than two percentage points higher than the average of the 
three euro-zone countries with the lowest HICP inflation.  
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The decision in regards to achievement or failure to meet the convergence criteria is 
made by the European Union Council.  At least once every two years, the European Central 
Bank publishes a Convergence Report to monitor and update the status of those aspiring to join 
the euro zone.  The very first Convergence Report was released in November of 1996.  In this 
initial report, it was discovered that of the original 15 European Union member states, only 3 
were completely compliant with the five convergence criteria.  As a result of this initial 
Convergence Report, the European Union Council decided to wait until a more positive report 
came out to introduce the euro.  That positive report came in 1998 when it was demonstrated that 
11 of the 12 aspiring countries were qualified.  The lone country not qualifying was Greece. 
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Chapter 2 - Crisis Timeline* 
 --2009-- 
Now knowing the history and structure of the European Union, we can investigate the 
evolution of the sequence of events that have taken place during the European debt crisis.  Most 
analysts argue that the crisis began on October 19, 2009, when Greek Prime Minister George 
Papandreou announced that Greece’s annual budget deficit/GDP ratio would be much greater 
than the originally projected number of 3.7 percent.  Then on November 5, 2009, Prime Minister 
Papandreou announced that the budget deficit would be a staggering 12.7 percent of gross 
domestic product (“GDP”), more than triple the original projection.  Following the adjusted 
projections, the rating agency Fitch cut Greece’s sovereign credit rating from A- to BBB+ with a 
negative outlook.  Then, in an attempt to increase competitiveness and combat the escalating 
problems, the Prime Minister outlined his plan of reforms to correct the fiscal path of Greece.  
With the release of his plan, he vowed that the deficit would fall to 3 percent of GDP by the end 
of his four-year term in 2013.  His plan revolved around reducing government operating 
expenditures and limiting consumption costs.  Also, the Prime Minister outlined his goal of 
trimming down bloated agencies and making necessary cuts in all public sectors.  The Greek 
sovereign credit rating was also cut on December 16, 2009 by Standard & Poor’s from A- to 
BBB+, and again later on December 22
nd
 by Moody’s from A1 to A2.  On December 17, the 
citizens of Greece took to the streets on strike.  Thousands of workers went on strike over the 
rating cut, rising unemployment figures, strict austerity measures and uncertainty about the 
future.  It was revealed that Greece’s sovereign debt burden was over €300 billion, which put 
Greek debt at 113 percent of GDP.  Recall that the Maastricht Treaty allows a maximum of 60 
percent debt to GDP.   During this same December period, Ireland implemented austerity 
*information for Crisis Timeline section is excerpted from Mead and Blight 2013; except where noted 
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measures that included increasing the minimum age to receive pensions by one year from 65 to 
66. 
 --2010-- 
In February of 2010, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero announced 
austerity measures which increased the retirement age by two years from 65 to 67 in Spain.  This 
plan faced fierce opposition from labor unions and many citizens; however, the plan was finally 
approved in January of 2011.  In early March of 2010, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou met 
with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and President of 
the United States Barack Obama and maintained that Greece was not in need of any type of 
bailout.  However, by the end of March, leaders of the International Monetary Fund and euro-
zone leaders agreed on a deal in which both parties would help Greece via financial support.  In 
April of 2010, Greece’s credit rating was further downgraded to junk status by Standard & 
Poor’s, which resulted in a skyrocketing of Greek government bond yields.  This downgrade 
came after the 2009 Greek budget deficit was revised upwards to 13.6 percent of GDP. 
On May 2, 2010, euro-zone leaders and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) leaders 
agreed to terms with Prime Minister Papandreou for a €110 billion bailout package to be 
implemented over a three-year period.  The agreement included a mandate for additional budget 
cuts to be made by Greece.  These additional budget cuts resulted in heavy protesting.  It was 
reported that over 50,000 people protested on the streets of Athens, and that 3 people were killed 
during the violent demonstration.  In the same month, euro-zone and IMF leaders created a €750 
billion emergency fund to secure struggling euro-zone economies.  With the vast uncertainty 
involved with the struggling euro-zone economies, the euro value steadily fell.  On June 8, 2010, 
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the euro closed at $1.19/€.  This was the lowest rate of exchange against the United States dollar 
since March of 2006. 
Later, in September 2010, Ireland’s central bank announced that the cost of bailing out 
Anglo Irish Bank, which was nationalized by the Irish Government in January of 2009, could top 
the €34.3 billion mark.  This raised Ireland’s budget deficit to 32 percent of GDP.  Then in 
November, Ireland’s government officially applied for bailout funds from the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund.  In conjunction with the application, Irish Prime Minister 
Brian Cowen submitted a strict austerity budget with the promise to hold a general election in 
2011.  Within a week, an €85 billion bailout package was approved by European leaders.  
 --2011-- 
 
In February of 2011, European finance ministers created the European Stability 
Mechanism.  This established a permanent €500 billion fund intended to serve as a lender of last 
resort for failing euro-zone economies.  Later on, in March of 2011, Portuguese Prime Minister 
José Sócrates resigned when his proposed austerity budget was rejected by opposing politicians.  
Portugal then witnessed a steep rise in government bond yields.  This led to a reduction in 
Standard & Poor’s rating of Portuguese sovereign debt.  It was in the following month of April 
that former Portuguese Prime Minister Sócrates requested bailout funding from the European 
Union and the International Monetary Fund.  The next month, European leaders approved a €78 
billion package for Portugal on the condition that Portugal implement a series of strict austerity 
measures. 
Later, in June of 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating again to 
CCC, which made Greek debt the lowest-rated sovereign debt in the entire world.  In the same 
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month, another round of austerity measures was implemented in Greece, which was met with 
widespread protests.  In July, Moody’s rating agency lowered Portugal’s debt rating to junk 
status after the agency was unimpressed with Portugal’s recovery following the May 2011 
bailouts.  This same month, European leaders agreed to an additional €109 billion package for 
Greece.  As a stabilizing measure for the euro zone as a whole, some existing Greek loans were 
restructured.  This resulted in the cost being passed to private bond holders.  Specifically, 
bondholders agreed to trade roughly €135 billion in bonds that were nearing maturity for bonds 
with longer maturities, resulting in a 21 percent haircut for bondholders.  This restructuring was 
characterized as a “selective default” by Fitch, which marked the first government default within 
the euro zone since the adoption of the euro. 
In August of 2011, Italy fell under intense scrutiny from investors, which pushed the 
interest rates on 10-year Italian government bonds over 6 percent.  This scrutiny was further 
inflamed by a shaky relationship between Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and finance 
minister Giulio Tremonti.  Also, Prime Minister Berlusconi was involved in personal scandals 
which further added to uncertainty of investors.  The fact that Italy owed a public debt of €1.9 
trillion -- 120 percent of GDP -- made the magnitude of debt for Italy second only to Greece in 
the euro-zone countries.  To appease investors, Berslusconi proposed €45 billion in spending 
cuts and tax increases for Italy.  These motions allowed Berslusconi to narrowly survive a 
confidence vote in Italy’s parliament.  One day after the passing of the confidence vote, 
demonstrations from protestors turned violent in Rome and over 100 protesters were injured. 
In October of 2011, Greek lawmakers narrowly passed another round of austerity 
measures, which included tax increases and public-sector wage cuts.  This round of austerity 
measures sparked a 48-hour strike which shut down Athens.  These demonstrations turned 
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violent and dozens of the 50,000 or more protesters were injured.  In the same month, euro-zone 
leaders met in Brussels to attempt to develop a long-term solution to the debt crisis.  The result 
of the private meetings in Brussels between Merkel, Sarkozy and Greece’s creditors resulted in a 
bond swap which effectively cut the value of Greek debt in half.  Furthermore, additional bailout 
measures agreed upon included the recapitalization of European banks and the expansion of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”), which is the European Union’s primary bailout 
mechanism.  Under the new arrangement, the EFSF would become a €1 trillion slush fund to 
insulate larger indebted economies such as Italy.  Also in October, global financial markets took 
a severe hit as Greek Prime Minister Papandreou called for a referendum on the latest European 
Union bailout plan.  This movement led to an internal revolt, and members of his own party 
called for his resignation.  Later, on November 9, Papandreou announced his resignation.  On the 
following day it was announced that the interim replacement for Papandreou would be former 
European Central Bank Vice President Lucas Papademos.  Papademos was sworn into office on 
November 11, 2011. 
On November 3, 2011, a summit of G20 leaders met at Cannes, France to discuss the 
International Monetary Fund and euro-zone financial crisis.  This was the first time that 
European leaders publicly declared that Greece’s departure from the euro was a possibility.  
Over the same time, Italian bond yields continued to soar.  On November 8
th
 Berlusconi 
effectively lost his parliamentary majority on a vote that many viewed as an unofficial vote of no 
confidence.  That same day, Berlusconi announced that he would step down if parliament would 
approve a new round of economic reforms.  Yields on Italian government 10-year bonds reached 
a staggering 7.5 percent.  Berlusconi finally was able to pass his budget, and stepped down on 
November 12
th
.  He was replaced by a politically independent economist named Mario Monti, 
12 
 
who previously had served on the European Commission.  Monti spent the first weeks 
assembling his government, but the markets took a dive due to the early inaction of Monti.  A 
bond auction was held on November 29, at which 10-year yields topped 7.5 percent, while 3-year 
bonds neared 8 percent. 
November 20, 2011 brought a change in government for Spain after voters elected to 
transition from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party to the Popular Party with an overall 
majority in parliament.  Prime Minister Zapatero remained the prime minister and Popular Party 
leader Mariano Rajoy began the task of forming the new government in Spain.  At the same 
time, in November of 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Belgium’s credit rating.  The 
downgrade came as a result of the 530 days without a formal government in Belgium.  After the 
downgrade, Belgian 10-year-bond yields jumped to 5.86 percent, which was the highest rate in 
over a decade.  This trend led Belgian lawmakers to work energetically towards building a 
coalition government.  During negotiations between lawmakers, Elio Di Rupo emerged as a 
favorite candidate to lead a grand coalition government.  He was sworn into office on December 
6, 2011.  Di Rupo’s promises were to cut spending and reduce the overall debt of Belgium. 
In Brussels on December 9, 2011, exactly 20 years after the meeting which concluded 
with the European Council conceiving the Maastricht Treaty, European leaders met to reshape 
the European Union.  Proposals discussed in the meetings included creating a fiscal stability 
union, integration techniques, and additional penalties for countries exceeding the specified debt 
requirements.  To enact these proposed agreements, changes to the existing European Union 
treaty protocol had to be made.  This process required unanimous approval from the 27 European 
Union leaders.  British Prime Minister David Cameron chose to withhold his vote after he was 
not granted some secure regulatory exemptions for London’s financial sector that he was 
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seeking.  All other 26 members of the European Union passed the changes which faced referenda 
or parliamentary approval from the member-state level.  When leaders met in Brussels on 
January 30
th
, the guidelines for fiscal discipline were finalized and 25 of the 27 European Union 
member states agreed to terms, with the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic choosing to 
opt out. 
In the days following the December 9
th
 meetings, a verbal conflict brewed between 
France and the United Kingdom.  In this same month, Moody’s cut Belgium’s credit rating; Fitch 
lowered France’s economic outlook to “negative”; and the euro continued to depreciate against 
the dollar.  Analysts blamed the continued slide of the euro on the lack of decisive action by 
European Union leaders and the European Central Bank to instill belief in the currency. 
On December 21, 2011, the European Central Bank loaned out €469 billion to over 500 
banks across Europe.  This action was taken to prevent a credit freeze and promote financing.  
The three-year loans were offered with a fixed 1 percent interest rate.  In January, Standard & 
Poor’s downgraded nine euro-zone member’s credit ratings, and classified Portugal and Cyprus 
bonds as junk status.  Portuguese 10-year-bond yields responded to news of the downgrade by 
skyrocketing to a record 18.29 percent.  Portugal became the second European country at the 
time to have its debt downgraded to non-investment status by all three ratings agencies. 
 --2012-- 
 
In February of 2012, Greek lawmakers were finalizing the debate on another round of 
strict austerity measures to open the door for an additional €130 billion in bailout funds from the 
European Central Bank, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund.  These 
debates triggered widespread violent protests.  Dozens were injured in protests in Athens once 
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again, as several buildings were set on fire.  However, the Greek parliament ultimately decided 
to accept the rounds of austerity measures, and collected the allotted bailout funds.  One 
condition to the bailout package was that Greece had to further restructure its debt.  Specifically, 
private-sector bondholders were asked to give up 53.5 percent of the nominal value of their 
bonds by swapping them for new ones which had lower interest rates, longer maturities, and 
carried higher credit ratings.  This agreement equated to around a 70 percent loss of the net 
present value of the debt.  As further incentive to participate in the restructuring program, 
investors also received two-year AAA European Financial Stability Facility bonds.   
In the same month, Moody’s once again made debt rating cuts for six European countries.  
Furthermore, the firm downgraded its economic outlook on France and the United Kingdom to 
negative.  Also in February, over 800 banks in Europe took advantage of the European Central 
Bank’s second round of loans aimed at creating financing.  This round of loans injected over 
€530 billion into the European banking system.  The money, in addition to the previous rounds 
of loans, totaled over €1 trillion injected into the European banking system to increase liquidity 
in the credit market and encourage lending. 
In March of 2012, yields on Italian and Spanish bonds dropped to five percent.  
Unemployment across the European Union reached a record high.  In Spain and Greece, 
unemployment rates hovered around 20 percent, while the unemployment rate for individuals 
under the age of 25 approached 50 percent.  During this time, manufacturing activity continued 
to drop and it was reported that the euro-zone’s economy contracted by 0.3 percent in the final 
quarter of 2011.  In Greece, a majority of private bondholders agreed to take a haircut of over 
fifty percent on their government bonds.  Bondholders agreed to swap their government bonds 
for longer term bonds with a lower interest rate.  On March 9, 2012, the Greek government 
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elected to exercise collective action clauses to force all bondholders to accept the deal, which 
allowed them to wipe off around €100 billion in debt.  The implementation of the collective 
action clauses marked a true loan default.  Unlike the selective default in July of 2011, this 
procedure was not optional.  This action caused billions of dollars to be paid out in credit-default 
swap insurance because it was declared a credit event by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association. 
 Also during March of 2012, hundreds of thousands of people filled the streets to protest 
new budget cuts in Spain.  The cuts, brought forth by Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, 
totaled €27 billion, and were aimed at bringing Spain back to the European Union acceptance 
zone.  Prime Minister Rajoy announced he was revising his previous announcement of a 2012 
public deficit goal of 4.4 percent of GDP for a more realistic goal of 5.8 percent of GDP.  
European Union leaders responded negatively to the revised goal and forced a compromise with 
the Spanish Prime Minister for a deficit target of 5.3 percent of GDP.  During this same month, 
the euro-zone finance ministers announced an expansion of the European Financial Stability 
Facility and European Stability Mechanism.  This move came as warnings were raised by the 
G20 and International Monetary Fund that the existing funds were not sufficient to handle a 
bailout of a large country such as Spain or Italy.  This move allowed for these two elements to 
have access to a combined €800 billion in funds. 
 In April of 2012, Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy announced an additional €10 billion in 
budget cuts due to a bond auction which failed to raise the desired funds.  However, the 
additional cuts did not stop the yields on Spanish bonds from increasing.  In Greece, the violence 
continued, and protesters used a retired pharmacist who committed suicide in protest of the 
austerity measures as a rallying symbol. 
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 Also in April, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte proposed cuts to social welfare programs 
in an attempt to bring the Netherlands in compliance with the European Union’s deficit cap.  
This created major pushback from citizens and Prime Minister Rutte lost the support of the 
people.  The government collapsed in short time, and new elections were scheduled. 
 In May of 2012, Europe began to see the rise of anti-austerity candidates.  Fançois 
Hollande was elected as the president of France and politicked for a pro-growth approach 
towards solving the crisis.  He chose to not focus on austerity measures, and rather attempt to 
stimulate growth across France. 
 Greece became the talk of the world as market analysts began to discuss what was being 
called “Grexit,” referring to Greece’s prospective exit from the euro zone.  A run on Greek banks 
became a serious concern as citizens and analysts suspected a possible return to their previous 
currency, the drachma.  On one day alone, May 14, 2012, Greek citizens withdrew over €700 
million from the Greek banking system. 
 In this same month, the Spanish government announced a €23 billion bailout of Bankia, 
Spain’s largest mortgage lender.  Spain also faced regional governments that were struggling 
with unsustainable levels of debt.  The scenario in Spain led to the Spanish reporting the highest 
levels of unemployment in the European Union at 24.3 percent.  Spanish 10-year bond yields 
rose to around 6.5 percent during this time, and the euro hit a 22-month low against the dollar.  
 In June, the Spanish government requested €100 billion in financial assistance from the 
European Union to recapitalize its banks.  Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy was hesitant to call it a 
bailout and elected to advertise it as a “soft loan.”  Markets initially accepted the “bailout” of 
Spain as good news; however, 10-year bond yields continued to rise and surged above 7 percent.  
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Shortly after the news, Moody’s downgraded the credit rating of Spain to just one step above 
junk status. 
 On June 17, 2012, Greek voters elected the pro-bailout New Democracy party.  The New 
Democracy formed a coalition government, and the leader Antonis Samaras became the new 
Prime Minister.  Samaras worked quickly to impose spending cuts in anticipation of a visit from 
European Union leaders, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central bank.  
Samaras hoped Greece would be able to attain supplemental funding to the €31 billion in 
scheduled aid in September of 2012.  It was estimated that if Greece was unable to attain this 
supplemental aid it would be unable to cover civil service salaries and pensions in the month of 
August. 
 In this same month, Cyprus joined the list of counties applying for a bailout, making it 
the fifth euro-zone country to apply.  Cyprus was impacted by the close economic ties to Greece 
and their great deal of exposure to the Greek economy via private loans and the purchases of 
Greek government debt.  This exposure amounted to nearly 160 percent of Cyprus’s GDP. 
 In July of 2012, Spanish 10-year bond yields once again surged above 7 percent.  During 
this same time, German and Austrian 2-year bond yields dropped below zero.  This period 
marked a historic low for borrowing costs in Germany, Austria, France, and Belgium as 
investors looked to find safe financial investments in the European Union.  On July 11
th
, violent 
protest erupted in Madrid as thousands of coal miners converged on Madrid to protest a 
reduction in mining subsidies.  That same day, Prime Minister Rajoy announced an austerity 
budget that included €65 billion in spending cuts and tax increases, causing further uproar.  On 
July 26
th
, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi made possibly the most important 
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statement of the debt crisis.  In a speech to bankers in London, Draghi was quoted as saying, 
“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.  And believe 
me, it will be enough.”  This statement caused confidence to go up in the euro and led to 
widespread belief in the future of the euro zone. 
 On September 6, 2012, the European Central Bank announced an unlimited but sterilized 
bond-buying program.  The meaning of sterilization is that the central bank would take actions to 
offset the bond purchases to avoid increasing the money supply.  This operation became known 
as the Outright Monetary Transaction and replaced the Securities Markets Program.  With the 
new plan, the European Central Bank purchased sovereign debt from countries that formally 
requested bailouts.  The option of continued conditional aid was available if there was adherence 
to strict budget requirements. 
 Later in September, German courts gave the green light on German participation in the 
permanent bailout fund known as the European Stability Mechanism.  Now accepting of the 
bailout fund, Germany added €190 billion to the €700 billion fund.  The legislative framework 
for the combined European Stability Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility 
was put together to begin in January 2013. 
 In November of 2012, Greece received news that the European Union and International 
Monetary Fund agreed to a deal that allowed Greece to cut their debt mountain by €40 billion.  
With this development, Greek Prime Minister Samaras, said that the landmark agreement opened 
the way to the county’s “rebirth.”  This deal came just in time for Greece as it allowed them to 
avert bankruptcy and secure their position in the euro zone.  In December, Ireland announced 
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another round of budget cuts was coming.  This time it was a cut of €2.5 billion.  The program 
imposed new property taxes and cuts in child benefits. 
 --2013-- 
 
In January 2013, European Commission President José Barroso made a series of bold 
statements in regards to the European crisis.  President Barroso said, “I think we can say that the 
existential threat against the euro has essentially been overcome.”  This statement came with a 
great deal of controversy across Europe and the world as uncertainty remained over the future of 
the euro. 
 In February of 2013, after a twenty-five-and-a-half hour negotiation session in Brussels, 
European leaders agreed on a budget deal for the rest of the decade that would lead to the first 
cut in European Union spending in its history.  Then in March, after months of uncertainty and 
indecision about a potential Cyprus bailout, news came down that a deal had been struck.  The 
basics of the bailout were a €10 billion injection into Cyprus, as well as the forced closure of 
Cyprus’s second-largest bank, Laiki Bank.  The new program was designed to protect deposits 
below the €100,000 limit, while accounts worth more than €100,000 would be moved to a “bad 
bank,” with the fear of being deemed valueless at the time.  The deal also forced a major 
restructuring of the Bank of Cyprus.  Depositors with over €100,000 in the Bank of Cyprus 
eventually faced losses of about 30 percent. 
 In May of 2013, unemployment reached an all time high level across the euro zone for 
citizens under the age of twenty-five.  During the previous month of April, 24.4 percent of the 
labor force under age twenty-five across the euro zone were unemployed.  At the same time, 
overall unemployment throughout the euro zone rose to 12.2 percent.  Later on in June, French 
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leader François Hollande declared the “crisis in the euro zone is over”.  This statement came as 
countries across the euro zone were facing record unemployment, continued protests, and 
uncertainty.  At the time the statement was made, unemployment rates for Greeks between the 
ages of 15 and 24 was fifty-nine percent.  Likewise in Spain, unemployment numbers for the 
same age group was at fifty-five percent.  The comments made by Hollande faced criticism from 
fellow Europeans and many other observers across the world. 
 Finally, on Wednesday August 14, 2013, signs of growth in Europe emerged after an 18-
month double-dip recession.  Europe’s economic commissioner, Olli Rehn, announced that the 
euro zone had expanded collectively by 0.3 percent in the three months prior to June.  This 
marked the first growth since the fall of 2011.  Rehn was hesitant to project celebratory gestures 
given the incredibly high unemployment figures and disparity in economic performance.  Rehn 
was quoted as saying, “Yes, this slightly more positive data is welcome – but there is no room 
for any complacency whatsoever.  I hope there will be no premature, self-congratulatory 
statements suggesting the crisis is over, for we all know that there are still substantial obstacles 
to overcome.  The growth figures remain low and the tentative signs of growth are still fragile.”  
The following graph shows the welcomed signs of 2013 growth in the euro zone.  Note, 
however, that eight member nations of the euro zone experienced declining GDP.  If one omits 
Germany and France from the sample of nations, euro-zone growth was negative in the second 
quarter of 2013. 
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Figure 1 
Percentage GDP Growth in 2
nd
 Quarter Compared With Previous Quarter 
 
Source: (Eurostat, 2013) – Second Estimate for the Second Quarter of 2013, September 4, 2013 
On Sunday September 22, 2013 Angela Merkel won election for her third-term in office.  
This made her the only leader in the euro zone to be re-elected since the snowballing debt crisis 
that began in 2010.  Of the seventeen countries in the euro zone, twelve governments have 
changed leadership as a result of the crisis.  The re-election of Merkel likely means that the 
Germans will remain pro-austerity and rather resistant to providing bailout funding. 
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Chapter 3 - Major Causes 
Now that we have examined the timeline of events in the European crisis, the next step is 
to understand and summarize the main causes of the crisis.  In short, one of the main causes of 
the entire issue was the blatant violation of the European Union rules by some nations.  Greece 
was the most extreme violator of the rules.  In addition to Greece, other countries are still in 
trouble, including Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal (“PIIGS”).  These troubled countries and 
economies are now paying a heavy price.  Below is a table which illustrates the government 
deficit/surplus of the PIIGS countries, as well as Germany, and the average of the whole euro-
area.   
Table 1 
Budget Surpluses as Percentage of GDP 
 
Source: (Eurostat 2, 2013) – General government deficit/surplus 
Not all of these countries violated the rules, and none of them did to the blatant extent of 
Greece.  For example, Spain and Ireland were two countries that actually ran budget surpluses 
for at least three consecutive years prior to the crisis.  However, we see that when the world 
recession began in 2008, they both quickly ran deep government deficits, at 4.5 percent, 11.2 
percent, and 9.7 percent for Spain, and 7.4 percent, 13.9 percent, and 30.8 percent for Ireland.  
Germany, on the other hand, did break the three percent European Union deficit/GDP limit in 
GEO/TIME 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Euro area (17 
countries) 
-3.1 -2.9 -2.5 -1.3 -0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.2 -3.7 
Germany -4.2 -3.8 -3.3 -1.6 0.2 -0.1 -3.1 -4.1 -0.8 0.2 
Ireland 0.4 1.4 1.7 2.9 0.1 -7.4 -13.9 -30.8 -13.4 -7.6 
Greece -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.6 -10.7 -9.5 -10.0 
Spain -0.3 -0.1 1.3 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4 -10.6 
Italy -3.6 -3.5 -4.4 -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.5 -4.5 -3.8 -3.0 
Portugal -3.7 -4.0 -6.5 -4.6 -3.1 -3.6 -10.2 -9.8 -4.4 -6.4 
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2003, 2004, and 2005.  It did not, however, receive penalties and is now the strongest country in 
the euro zone.  From this table we can see just how high some of the deficits were during 2009, 
2010, and 2011.  Again, in Ireland a staggering 30.8 percent ratio of deficit to GDP was run in 
2010. 
Debt in these countries became a large burden because the government of each took 
advantage of extremely low interest rates to boost expenditures for nearly a decade.  The 
following graph shows the long term interest rates of government bonds for the PIIGS countries, 
as well as the United Kingdom and Germany over the period extending from 1993-2013. 
Figure 2 
Change in Percent of Long Term Interest Rates for 8 European Countries 
 
Source: (European Central Bank, 2013) – Harmonized long-term interest rates 
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This very interesting graph illustrates the convergence of the interest rates as the euro is 
introduced.  We can observe the high cost level that Greece was facing to borrow prior to the 
euro.  As the introduction of the euro drew near, Greek bond yields dropped from nearly 25 
percent in 1993, to 6 percent at the start of the euro in 1999.  The same is true to a less severe 
extent in the countries of Italy, Portugal, Spain, and even Ireland.  We can also observe that prior 
to the economic crisis that set everything in motion, all of these countries were able to borrow at 
extremely low rates relative to the rates they were facing before the introduction of the euro.  
Then, after the economic crisis reached Europe and uncertainty about the future set in, interest 
rates quickly diverged from German and French levels.  We see that Greek bond yields 
skyrocketed up to 29 percent in 2011.  All of this easy credit during the pre-crisis years made it 
enticing for countries such as Greece to borrow heavily.  The crisis brought unemployment and 
hardship for workers.  This process created a compression in demand, and many defaults 
occurred on loans made to citizens laid off during the recession.  In Spain and Ireland, this 
proved to be catastrophic because banks that were becoming insolvent owing to defaults on 
mortgages had to be propped up by the government to maintain solvency.  This was the same 
circumstance that other economies which witnessed a housing bubble experienced. 
Low interest rates fueled domestic spending and generated inflation of wages and goods.  
This labor cost increase caused the prices of goods to go up, and therefore made exports more 
expensive and imports relatively cheap.  Germany, however, made it a high priority to suppress 
wage increases and thus still maintained low prices relative to fellow euro-zone members.  This 
policy made their exports cheap relative to other euro-zone countries, and helped make them the 
most competitive euro-zone economy. 
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Chapter 4 - Analysis 
As discussed in the timeline summary of the euro-zone crisis, members of the euro 
agreed to write down half of the Greek debt owned by the private sector.  In addition, they 
agreed to recapitalize banks in Europe and boost the emergency fund to protect euro-zone 
governments.  Whether this will prove to be enough to save nations such as Greece remains to be 
seen.  The process to recovery will certainly be long and painful, as the road currently being 
taken is the road of strict austerity. 
This austerity path, however, risks being self-destroying.  The strict austerity measures 
will certainly make the current debt in these countries harder to manage, and will stymie growth.  
According to The Economist (2011), Germany’s approach suffers from a fallacy of composition.  
It is not possible for all countries to save their way to prosperity.  To argue this thought, Keynes 
pointed out after the depression, that someone, somewhere must be consuming.  In Europe, the 
countries with potential to be consuming heavily are those such as Germany and the Netherlands.  
Both of these countries have run current-account surpluses but they are hesitant to become 
creditors.  They may need to take on this role more deeply to prevent contagion.  
Understandably, Germany has been the voice for more responsibility from PIIGS’ governments 
so that German taxpayers will not have to foot the bill for bailouts when countries overspend.  
One major aspect of this entire crisis is the inability of some of the euro-zone nations, 
known as the periphery, to compete with the core countries.  The core countries consist of the 
most powerful and wealthy amongst the euro zone, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and 
France.  The periphery countries are those which are smaller in market share, and are generally 
subject to the decisions made by the core nations.  One measurement that is used to examine the 
26 
 
competitiveness among countries is the unit labor costs.  Unit labor costs calculate the average 
cost of labor per unit of output.  Algebraically, unit labor cost can be found using the following 
formula: 
Unit Labor Cost = W/(q/L) 
In this equation: W is labor compensation, q denotes physical output, and L is total employment. 
 The unit labor cost by definition is the ratio of total labor costs to real output.  Thus, this 
statistic is a critical piece of the puzzle towards understanding the issues within the European 
Union.  Unit labor costs represent a bond between productivity and the cost of labor in producing 
output.  If a country’s unit labor costs are increasing in comparison to a competing country, the 
rising-cost nation will lose market share as it loses ability to compete with the more productive 
country.  The unit labor cost, which I will utilize for investigation in the following chart, is a 
measurement in this case shown as in index number relative to 1999 levels, which are 
normalized and set equal to 100.  
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Figure 3 
Unit Labor Costs in the Euro Zone 
Source: (AMECO Database, 2013) – Annual macro-economic database 
As we can see from the data, in the years prior to the debt crisis, German unit labor costs 
increased much more slowly than in the PIIGS nations.  In fact, note that German unit labor costs 
since 1999 had actually decreased slightly until just before the recession in 2008.  In contrast, the 
unit labor costs of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain had all increased greatly.  This implies that 
prices were raised more rapidly by PIIGS firms than by German firms.  We also see in the post-
2009 period, the debt-strapped PIIGS countries displayed a slight decrease in unit labor costs 
through 2010.  Following 2010, Italy has been the only PIIGS country to display a continuing 
rise in unit labor cost.  We do see that Germany witnessed an increase in unit labor cost in the 
2008-2012 period.  Although Germany observed a slight decrease from 2009 to 2010, it has 
observed a slight and steady increase since 2010. 
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 It is important to note, that from 2009 to 2013, the unit labor costs of Spain and Portugal 
have fallen steadily.  In Spain, this decline was the result of significant wage cuts made in 
combination with a slight rise in productivity.  Ireland’s unit labor costs skyrocketed during 2007 
and 2008 and have decreased sharply since then. 
 This graph really shows the underlying divergence that has occurred in unit labor cost in 
the euro zone.  The decrease of the unit labor costs of some PIIGS countries suggests that there 
has been some convergence of unit labor costs since the recession, but the process remains far 
from complete.  Germany’s decline in unit labor costs is not due to any acceleration in 
productivity growth.  The reduction is caused by a wage restraint.  The strategies of Germany to 
position itself in great standing were to increase its current-account surplus through expanding its 
commercial exports.  (Rossi, 2012) 
 As a result of the failure of the PIIGS nations to hold down unit labor costs and price 
levels like nations such as Germany, they have experienced large current account deficits since 
the beginning of the euro.  The following figure illustrates the current account balances as a 
share of GDP for each of the PIIGS countries. 
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Figure 4 
Current Account Balance as Share of GDP of Several Euro-Zone Member Nations 
 
 
Source: (Eurostat 3, 2013) – Balance of the current account database 
  
As illustrated in the figure, Germany has run large trade surpluses, typically exceeding 5 
percent of GDP.  Their current account surplus increased by 7.5 percentage points of GDP from 
2001-2007.  Since 2007, Germany has maintained a level of surplus averaging roughly 6 percent.  
In contast, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have experienced current accound deficits, though the 
deficits have declined sharply since 2008. 
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If competitiveness is to be regained by the PIIGS countries, which will be a very difficult 
task with the euro, wages will have to come down or productivity growth will have to go up.  
The natural way to normally accomplish competitiveness for countries is by currency 
devaluation.  However, that is not an option in the single currency group of euro-zone countries.  
Furthermore, the monetary union has imposed fiscal rigidity which has removed monetary 
independence.  This has led to many discussions surrounding labor market adjustments because 
many believe that labor market adjustments are the most feasible way to adjust competitiveness.  
Because increasing productivity is not easy and generally not something that can be 
accomplished immediately, much focus has been placed on the prospects of beneficial labor 
market techniques.   
 The most prevalent labor market technique is to decrease the nominal wage rates in a 
country.  This represents a sort of internal devaluation.  However, decreasing the nominal wage 
rate creates psychological and legal problems.  Thus, the question is whether workers in 
struggling countries such as Spain, where over a fifth of the labor force is unemployed, would 
accept a reduction in wages.  Not only is it questionable whether the wage cut would be 
accepted, but also if individuals would still be willing to work just as hard as before the cuts to 
maintain their firms’ competitiveness.  In order to keep their jobs in the face of the staggering 
unemployment figures, this certainly may be the case. 
In the chart below we can view the high unemployment figures facing these PIIGS countries. 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: (Eurostat 4, 2013) – Unemployment rate – quarterly average, % 
 As we see from the graph, the unemployment figures are staggering.  In examining this 
graph created using data provided by eurostat, we see Germany had a higher unemployment rate 
than all of the PIIGS countries prior to the recession.  Germany’s unemployment rate went from 
the highest to the lowest from 2006-2013 among the nations graphed.  Prior to the recession, we 
see that Ireland maintained the lowest unemployment rate of the countries included.  As the year 
2008 approached, we witnessed a convergence of unemployment rates.  As the recession, and 
following euro-crisis unfolded, we see unemployment rates diverged, and the rates for Spain and 
Greece skyrocketed.  Germany’s unemployment rate was largely unaffected by the euro-crisis 
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and actually continued to decline after early-2009.  Italian unemployment rates were slightly 
lower than, but largely mirrored the overall euro-area trend throughout the crisis.  In Greece, we 
see that unemployment exploded following the crisis as the country implemented strict austerity 
measures.  The same is true for Spain, as we see the unemployment rate in mid-2013 was 26.4 
percent.  Interestingly, we observe that after a steady increase in Portugal’s unemployment rate 
over the past few years, we notice a definite decline in 2013.   
According to Jose Diogo Albuquerque, Portugal’s Secretary of State for Agriculture, this 
increased employment is due to the renewed growth in farming.  The number of farming-related 
jobs increased 10.6 percent in the second quarter of 2013 from the previous 3 months.  Portugal 
had undertaken a shift from the farming sector, which used to be its largest industry, to the 
service sector.  Albuquerque was quoted recently stating, “What I have started to note is an 
economic reversal, a return to the basics.”  According to Albuquerque, the renewed growth in the 
farming sector stems from young workers who are unable to find jobs in the urban areas.  An 
average of 280 entrepreneurs a month under the age of 40 started a new farming business in 
Portugal, taking advantage of €1.3 billion a year in European Union and government grants for 
farm development. (Almeida, 2013)   
 While many of these Portuguese workers have been able to take advantage of the farming 
sector in Portugal to find employment, the unemployment numbers for young people across the 
rest of the euro-zone countries are not as encouraging.  The following graph shows the 
unemployment rates for individuals from the ages of 15-24 separated by country. 
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Figure 6 
Youth Unemployment Rates in Europe 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Eurostat 4, 2013) – Same as Figure 5, selected age less than 25 years 
 
This graph shows the true disparity that young workers are facing in the euro-zone 
countries.  We can see from the graph that in Greece, young workers are facing an 
astronomically high unemployment rate of 61.5 percent as of June 2013.  Nearly equally as 
staggering is the unemployment rate for young people in Spain, which is 56 percent.  Other 
countries facing rampant unemployment for young people pictured in the graph are Croatia, 
Italy, Cyprus, Portugal, and Slovakia.  On the other end of the spectrum, many countries are 
experiencing very good employment numbers for their youth.  Germany has the lowest youth 
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unemployment rate at 7.7 percent.  Austria is close behind with a rate of 8.6 percent.  We also 
see from the graph that the overall euro-zone average is 23.7 percent.  This number is a historic 
high and nearly twice as high as the adult rate, which according to eurostat was 12.0 percent in 
August of 2013. 
 The very high rates of unemployment faced by some of the member states have caused 
many to worry about the possibility of a “lost generation”.  The worry is that this high youth 
unemployment will create a class of poorly educated and motivated people deprived of the 
opportunity to develop important work skills during their formative years.  The “lost generation” 
would maintain low morale and would be relatively unproductive compared to other generations.  
Having a future adult population with this sort of low morale and lack of work ethic and skills 
could prove to stymie any hope for a turnaround in competitiveness for the struggling countries 
of the euro zone. (Bruton, 2013) 
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Chapter 5 - Solutions 
The process of fixing the lack of competitiveness and poor growth prospects would 
generally be relatively simple for nations that have control over their exchange rate.  Typically, 
states would simply devalue their currency to regain competitiveness.  However, with the euro, 
that sort of solution is impossible and would require an exit from the euro zone. 
The current path taken to combat and solve the euro-zone debt crisis has largely been one 
of austerity measures.  Because of the current path, and re-election of German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, it is likely that this austerity strategy will continue.  Again, austerity measures involve 
debt-reduction policies.  It is important to note that there are two main types of austerity 
measures.  The first type deals with tax-increases to raise funds for the government to reduce 
deficits.  The second type is to cut spending.  Most austerity packages utilize a combination of 
both spending cuts and tax increases.  According to many economists, spending cuts are more 
effective than tax increases in reducing the ratio of debt to GDP.  (Rugy, 2013) 
In a study done by the American Enterprise Institute, economists Andrew Biggs, Kevin 
Hassett, and Matthew Jensen found that countries which addressed budget shortfalls by reducing 
spending were much more likely to decrease their debt than countries that implemented higher 
taxes.  Furthermore, the study found that the average unsuccessful fiscal consolidation consisted 
of a fifty-three percent increase in taxes and a forty-seven percent cut in spending.  In contrast, 
they found that the average successful austerity packages consisted of eighty-five percent 
spending cuts. (Rugy, 2013) 
Another idea discussed amongst economists and politicians is the option of a tax reform 
mimicking the effects of an external devaluation which is referred to as a fiscal, or internal 
devaluation.  Fiscal devaluation is essentially a budget-neutral reduction of payroll taxes 
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balanced out through hikes in other taxes or cuts in government expenditures.  The typical 
example of fiscal devaluation consists of a reduction of employers’ contributions and an increase 
in the value added tax rate (VAT).  With nominal wage rigidity, the reduction in the social 
security contributions rate depresses unit labor costs and increases competitiveness.  The result 
of this increased competitiveness is an increase in net exports.  In conjunction with the lower 
social security contributions, the higher VAT rate lowers consumption and imports without 
affecting exports.  The result of this process is an expansion of output and an improvement in the 
trade balance. (Bettendorf et al., 2013) 
In a working paper compiled by office of the European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Taxation and Customs Union, it was concluded that fiscal devaluation can have a 
positive effect on employment, GDP and net exports.  The same study stated that unilateral 
implementation of the policy is a viable option for a country wishing to expand its GDP.  The 
study also found that the policy of course has far more benefit to an individual nation if it is not 
implemented simultaneously by multiple nations.  However, the study concludes that when the 
goal of the policy is to stimulate the economy of the European Union as a whole, broad 
implementation is considered the most attractive method.  The positive effects garnered by this 
policy in any type of implementation are found to be rather small, and temporary, but 
nonetheless can help.  (Bettendorf et al., 2013) 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
The European Union was created with noble intentions.  In the sense of the European 
Union being created to stop wars between its nations, it has been a success.  Furthermore, the 
introduction of the euro as the single currency for member nations was seemingly intended to 
bring about stability and increase welfare for the euro zone as a whole.  However, the 
introduction of the euro as a single currency also meant that countries with sovereign debt issues 
would no longer be able to utilize monetization and devaluation to avoid defaulting on their 
obligations during recessionary times.   
Countries that have chosen to become part of the euro zone have essentially forfeited 
their ability to take the usual and necessary steps to overcome, or avoid, such crises.  The crisis 
that has taken place has highlighted the fundamental flaws of the euro zone.  The most obvious 
flaw is demonstrated by the struggle of managing very different countries and economies in the 
absence of the options to devalue or monetize debt.  During the economic good times, weaker 
economies such as Greece were able to borrow at unprecedented low costs.  Unfortunately, the 
savings were not efficiently employed to promote growth and development.  These nations did 
little during the economic good times to suppress labor costs or to transform themselves into 
long-term competitors.   
Germany is currently prospering because it maintained low unit labor costs and has an 
efficient work force; yet it has to help cover other member states such as Greece, which have 
been irresponsible and relatively inefficient.  Germany has been helped greatly by its 
involvement with the euro.  This is due to the fact that the weaker countries of the euro zone 
have kept the value of the euro relatively low, which suppresses the costs of German exports in 
non-euro nations, making German products cheaper relative to those of non-European countries.  
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This phenomenon would not take place if Germany were not part of the euro zone.  This 
advantage, along with low unit labor costs, and the efficiency of the labor force, has allowed the 
German economy to thrive while their neighbors struggle. 
The crisis is very much unresolved.  Staggering unemployment numbers continue in 
many of the PIIGS countries.  Importantly, the extremely high youth unemployment numbers in 
Greece and Spain have caused very real and serious concerns of a “lost generation”.  Greece and 
other bailed-out nations will likely face very tough times for many years to come as they suffer 
from the process of debt reduction through austerity.  The European Union is also experiencing 
great division among its countries.  The prosperous economies, such as Germany, are 
increasingly angry about having to cover for their failing neighbors.  In addition to the German 
dislike of having to pay the price of irresponsibility for the troubled economies, the populations 
of the struggling economies continue to show resentment from being forced into austerity and 
from German unwillingness to aid its euro-zone neighbors by stimulating the German economy.  
A currency union simply cannot survive if its members are divided and pursue different 
economic and regulatory policies.  In order for the euro to survive long term, member nations 
will have to become more integrated, and must take steps to balance competitiveness amongst 
themselves.  The euro-zone nations must aim to correct the structural imbalances within the 
common currency area by improving the coordination of financial, economic, and social policies.  
If the member countries are unwilling to take these steps, then a euro-zone breakup will likely 
occur in the future and the countries will resort to separate currencies. 
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